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ABSTRACT It is of great importance in telemedicine to protect authenticity and 
integrity of medical images. They are mainly addressed by two technologies, which 
are region of interest (ROI) lossless watermarking and reversible watermarking. 
However, the former causes biases on diagnosis by distorting region of none interest 
(RONI) and introduces security risks by segmenting image spatially for watermark 
embedding. The latter fails to provide reliable recovery function for the tampered 
areas when protecting image integrity. To address these issues, a novel robust 
reversible watermarking scheme is proposed in this paper. In our scheme, a reversible 
watermarking method is designed based on recursive dither modulation (RDM) to 
avoid biases on diagnosis. In addition, RDM is combined with Slantlet transform and 
singular value decomposition to provide a reliable solution for protecting image 
authenticity. Moreover, ROI and RONI are divided for watermark generation to 
design an effective recovery function under limited embedding capacity. Finally, 
watermarks are embedded into whole medical images to avoid the risks caused by 
segmenting image spatially. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed 
lossless scheme not only has remarkable imperceptibility and sufficient robustness, 
but also provides reliable authentication, tamper detection, localization and recovery 
functions, which outperforms existing schemes for protecting medical images. 
INDEX TERMS Robust reversible watermarking, authenticity, integrity, medical 
image
I. INTRODUCTION 
Telemedicine is a potential way to provide more 
convenient medical services for patients in near 
future [1]-[3]. However, medical images 
transmitted through network in telemedicine 
applications can be easily tampered and forged, 
which increases the risks of misdiagnosis. 
Therefore, the image authenticity and integrity 
have become two crucial security factors in 
telemedicine applications [4]-[6]. Authenticity 
guarantees that medical images are not forged 
from the attackers and belong to the correct 
medical institutes or patients [7]-[9]. Integrity 
means that medical images have not been 
modified by non-authorized people [10]-[12]. 
The schemes designed to protect the authenticity 
and integrity of medical images are required to 
ensure that these images are distortion free. 
Otherwise, the image distortions may lead to 
misdiagnosis and even endanger patients’ lives.  
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Existing watermarking schemes used for 
verifying authenticity and integrity of medical 
images can be classified into two main 
categories, which are region of interest (ROI) 
lossless watermarking schemes [13]-[21] and 
reversible watermarking schemes [22]-[29]: 
ROI lossless watermarking schemes divide 
medical images into ROI, which is considered as 
the most important part for medical diagnosis, 
and region of none interests (RONI) in spatial 
domain. Tamper detection, localization and 
recovery information of ROI are generated as the 
watermarks. These watermarks are embedded 
into ROI reversibly or RONI irreversibly. In this 
manner, the integrity of ROI is well protected 
with necessary localization and recovery 
functions for the tampered areas of attacked ROI. 
However, RONI cannot be restored losslessly in 
these schemes, and thus there are still negative 
impacts on diagnosis although the ROI is 
distortion free. Furthermore, the segmentation of 
ROI and RONI in spatial domain for watermark 
embedding incurs extra security risks because it 
is easy to destroy all the information embedded 
in RONI by simply replacing the RONI spatially.  
Reversible watermarking schemes can 
restore medical images losslessly and avoid the 
security risks caused by spatial segmentation of 
the ROI and RONI for watermark embedding. 
However, due to the limited embedding capacity 
of reversible watermarking, they do not embed 
tamper recovery information into medical 
images and thus cannot provide any recover 
function for the tampered areas of attacked 
medical images.  
In this paper, a novel robust reversible 
watermarking scheme for protecting authenticity 
and integrity of medical images is proposed to 
solve the above-mentioned issues. There are four 
phases in our scheme: 1) watermark generation 
phase; 2) watermark embedding phase; 3) 
watermark extraction phase; and 4) security 
verification phase.  
In the first phase, authenticity data and 
integrity data are generated. Our authenticity 
data is hash values of a hospital logo and our 
integrity data includes tamper detection, 
localization, and recovery information.  In 
specific, the tamper detection information is 
generated by using hash function of a whole 
medical image. The tamper localization 
information is generated by calculating Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) of each ROI block. 
And the tamper recovery information is 
generated by using integer wavelet transform 
(IWT) coefficients of ROI with block truncation 
coding (BTC). In the second phase, all the 
watermarks are embedded into the medical 
image using Slantlet transform (SLT), singular 
value decomposition (SVD) and recursive dither 
modulation (RDM) to ensure the watermarking 
robustness. In the third phase, an inverse process 
of watermark embedding is performed to extract 
the watermarks. After all the watermarks are 
extracted, the medical image is restored 
losslessly based on the RDM function. The final 
phase verifies the authenticity and integrity of 
medical images and recovers their tampered 
areas of ROI if they are attacked. 
To our best knowledge, it is the first 
watermarking scheme which divides ROI and 
RONI for watermark generation but not for 
watermark embedding. The differences between 
our proposed scheme and other existing schemes 
are illustrated in Figure 1. Furthermore, the key 
contributions of our proposed watermarking 
scheme are summarized as follows: 
1) A SLT-SVD and RDM based reversible 
watermarking method is designed, which 
ensures sufficient watermark robustness and can 
restore both ROI and RONI losslessly. 
2) ROI and RONI are divided for the 
generation of tamper localization and recovery 
information to provide an effective recovery 
function for the tampered ROI under limited 
embedding capacity, which cannot be achieved 
by existing reversible watermarking schemes. 
3) IWT and BTC are used to generate tamper 
recovery information of ROI. The use of these 
methods offers a remarkable trade-off between 
visual quality of the recovered ROI and its 
required embedding capacity. 
4) Watermarks are embedded into the whole 
medical images without dividing ROI and RONI. 
In this manner, the security risks caused by the 
segmentation of the ROI and the RONI in spatial 
domain for watermark embedding are avoided, 
which outperforms existing ROI-lossless 
watermarking schemes. 
Experiments have been implemented on 200 
medical images including 40 Computed 
Tomography (CT) images, 40 magnetic 
resonance images (MRI), 40 Ultrasound images, 
40 X-ray images and 40 fundus images. The 
results demonstrate that our proposed scheme 
not only ensures remarkable watermarking 
imperceptibility and robustness but also provides 
reliable authentication, tamper detection, 
localization and recovery for medical images. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows: the 
related works are discussed in Section II. Our 
proposed watermarking scheme is described in 
detail in Section III. Experiment results and 
discussions are presented in Section IV. Finally, 
conclusions of this paper are presented in 
Section V. 
2169-3536 (c) 2019 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2921894, IEEE
Access
 
 
Tamper detection 
information
Tamper localization 
information
Tamper recovery 
information
Authenticity data
Divide
Divide
Irreversible embedding
Reversible embedding
Hospital Logo
Watermark generation
ROI
RONI
ROI
RONI
Medical image
Medical image
 
(a) 
Tamper detection 
information
Tamper localization 
information
Authenticity data
Reversible embedding
Hospital Logo
Watermark generation
Medical image
Medical image
 
(b) 
Tamper detection 
information
Tamper localization 
information
Tamper recovery 
information
Authenticity data
Reversible embedding
Hospital Logo
Divide
Watermark generation
Watermark generation
ROI
RONI
Medical image
Medical image
 
(c) 
FIGURE 1.  Differences between our proposed watermarking scheme and other existing watermarking schemes. (a) 
ROI-lossless watermarking scheme, (b) reversible watermarking scheme, (c) our proposed watermarking scheme 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. ROI-LOSSLESS WATERMARKING 
ROI-lossless watermarking schemes divide 
medical images into ROI and RONI in spatial 
domain for watermarks generation and 
embedding. Tjokorda et al. [13] propose a 
ROI-lossless watermarking scheme, in which the 
least significant bits (LSB) of ROI pixels are 
replaced by tamper detection information, 
tamper localization information and tamper 
recovery information. The original LSBs of ROI 
pixels are compressed by run length encoding 
(RLE) and then embedded into RONI by 
replacing two LSBs of RONI pixels to ensure 
the reversibility of ROI. Liew et al. [14] propose 
another ROI-lossless watermarking scheme, in 
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which CRC of each ROI block and JPEG 
compression of ROI are embedded into LSBs of 
RONI for tamper localization and tamper 
recovery. Eswaraiah et al. [15] propose LSB- 
based watermarking scheme, in which hash 
value of ROI and original ROI LSBs are 
compressed by using RLE and embedded into 
LSBs of ROI for tamper detection. The parity bit 
of mean values of ROI blocks and mean values 
of ROI blocks are embedded into LSBs of RONI 
for tamper localization and tamper recovery. 
Kim et al. [16] keep ROI undistorted and embed 
tamper localization information and tamper 
recovery information of ROI into RONI by using 
homogeneity analysis and histogram shifting. 
Priya et al. [17] propose a LSB-based 
watermarking scheme, in which hash values of 
each ROI block and compression of ROI are 
embedded into LSBs of RONI for tamper 
localization and tamper recovery. All these 
watermarking schemes embed watermarks into 
the spatial domain of ROI or RONI fragilely. 
Therefore, the embedded watermarks are 
destroyed when medical images are attacked. It 
leads to a failure of tamper localization and 
recovery for the tampered areas of images. To 
address this issue, frequency domain-based 
ROI-lossless watermarking schemes are 
proposed. Maheshkar et al. [18] propose a 
frequency domain ROI-lossless watermarking 
scheme, in which tamper detection information 
and localization information are embedded into 
ROI by replacing two LSBs of each pixel. The 
original ROI LSBs as recovery information is 
embedded into RONI along with hospital logo 
and electronic patient record (EPR) by using 
IWT-SVD hybrid transform. Alhaj et al. [19] 
propose another frequency domain 
watermarking scheme, in which LSBs of ROI 
are replaced by fragile watermark to detect 
tamper. Three watermarks, hospital logo, EPR 
and original ROI LSBs, are embedded into 
RONI by using discrete wavelet transform 
(DWT) and SVD. Compared with the spatial 
domain ROI-lossless watermarking schemes, the 
frequency domain ROI-lossless watermarking 
schemes provide stronger robustness against 
attacks. 
However, none of the above-mentioned 
ROI-lossless watermarking schemes can restore 
RONI losslessly, which increases the risks on the 
diagnosis. In addition, medical images are 
divided into ROI and RONI in spatial domain 
for watermark embedding in these schemes, 
which introducing additional security risks 
because all the information embedded in RONI 
can be destroyed easily by simply replacing the 
RONI spatially. 
B. REVERSIBLE WATERMARKING 
To address the issues of ROI-lossless 
watermarking schemes, reversible watermarking 
schemes are proposed. Reversible watermarking 
schemes do not divide medical images into ROI 
and RONI for watermark generation and 
watermark embedding. Thodi et al. [22] propose 
a fragile reversible watermarking scheme, in 
which watermarks are embedded based on 
prediction-error expansion. Gouenou et al. [23] 
apply histogram shifting modulation on 
prediction-errors to make use of the local 
specificities of the image for higher watermark 
capacity and image quality. In addition, they 
design a classification process to select the part 
of image which can be watermarked. Luo et al. 
[24] propose an interpolation-error based 
watermarking scheme to improve the quality of 
watermarked images. Zhang et al. [25] generate 
watermark based on quantized discrete cosine 
transform (DCT) coefficients of each block and 
then embed it into LSBs of corresponding block 
to detect and locate tamper. Although the scheme 
[25] can locate tampered blocks, the located 
blocks cannot be recovered. Ishtiaq et al. [26] 
propose a prediction-error expansion based 
watermarking scheme, in which a hybrid 
predictor is used to enhance the prediction 
efficiency and the adaptive embedding is used to 
improve embedding capacity. Feng et al. [27] 
use wavelet histogram shifting for reversible 
embedding. In addition, Logistic mapping, Torus 
mapping and CRC are used to improve the 
security of the watermark. These fragile 
reversible watermarking schemes can protect 
integrity of medical images effectively and 
restore medical images losslessly. However, 
when medical images are attacked, the 
embedded watermarks are destroyed and cannot 
be extracted correctly to protect authenticity of 
medical images. To address this issue, robust 
reversible watermarking schemes are proposed. 
Lei et al. [28] propose an IWT-SVD based 
watermarking scheme, in which SVD is 
performed on the low frequency coefficients of 
wavelet transform. The first singular value is 
then selected and one watermark bit is embedded 
into it by using RDM. Thabit et al. [29] propose 
a SLT-based watermarking scheme, in which 
one watermark bit is embedded by modifying the 
difference between the mean values of low-high 
frequency sub-bands and those of high-low 
frequency sub-bands in SLT domain. Compared 
with fragile reversible watermarking schemes, 
robust reversible watermarking schemes provide 
stronger robustness to resist attacks.  
However, none of the above-mentioned 
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reversible watermarking schemes embed tamper 
recovery information into medical images to 
provide any recovery function for the tampered 
areas of the attacked medical images because 
their embedding capacity is limited. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
Our proposed robust reversible watermarking 
scheme provides an effective and simultaneous 
solution for verifying authenticity and integrity 
of medical images. In our proposed scheme, the 
authenticity data is generated from the hash 
values of a hospital logo. ROI and RONI are 
divided for generation of integrity data to satisfy 
the limitation of watermark embedding capacity. 
Hash function of a whole medical image is used 
to generate tamper detection information. To 
locate the tampered areas of ROI, ROI is divided 
into 16×16 non-overlapping blocks and CRC is 
adopted on every block for generating tamper 
localization information of ROI. A method based 
on IWT coefficients is used to generate tamper 
recovery information of ROI [20]. In addition, 
BTC is adopted to further reduce the size of 
tamper recovery information of ROI. 
Authenticity data, tamper detection information 
of the medical image, tamper localization and 
recovery information of ROI are embedded into 
the whole medical image. As shown in Figure 2, 
our proposed reversible watermarking scheme 
has four phases: watermark generation phase, 
watermark embedding phase, watermark 
extraction phase and security verification phase. 
The detailed processes of each phase are 
described below. 
A. WATERMARK GENERATION PHASE 
In this phase, the generated watermarks consist 
of authenticity data and integrity data. 
Authenticity data is hash values of a hospital 
logo. And integrity data includes tamper 
detection information of the whole medical 
image, tamper localization and recovery 
information of ROI. The processes of 
watermarks generation phase are shown in 
Figure 3 and described below. 
1) GENERATION OF AUTHENTICITY DATA  
Because the possibility that hash functions of 
different messages are the same is closed to 0, 
the hash function is applied to generate 
authenticity data as shown in Eq. (1). 
( )A f L=                (1) 
where f(•) is SHA-1 hash function, L is a 
hospital logo, A is the 160-bit authenticity data. 
2) GENERATION OF TAMPER DETECTION 
INFORMATION 
Due to the same reason with that for generation 
of authenticity data, the hash function is also 
applied to generate tamper detection information 
as shown in Eq. (2). 
( )D f M=               (2) 
where f(•) is SHA-1 hash function, M is a 
medical image, D is a 160-bit tamper detection 
information of the medical image.  
3) GENERATION OF TAMPER LOCALIZATION 
INFORMATION 
In this paper, CRC-16 [30] is applied to generate 
tamper localization information of ROI instead 
of using hash functions. The steps of generation 
of tamper localization information are as 
follows: 
Step 1: Normalize the ROI selected by 
clinicians, as shown in Figure 4. In addition, the 
coordinates of normalized ROI are saved as side 
information. 
Step 2: Divide normalized ROI into 16×16 
non-overlapping blocks. 
Step 3: Select a fixed polynomial generator 
G(x) = x16+x15+x2+1, which can be converted to 
a binary digital “11000000000000101”. 
Step 4: Convert each pixel of a block to 8-bit 
binary numbers and rearrange them to a vector. 
Step 5: Append 16 0’s to the end of this 
vector. 
Step 6: Divide the vector by the polynomial 
generator based on the binary division to obtain 
the 16-bit remainder as CRC of a block for 
tamper localization. An example of the process 
of CRC is shown as follows:  
Watermark 
generation phase
Watermark 
embedding phase
Watermark 
extraction phase
Security 
verification phase
FIGURE 2.  The four different phases of our proposed watermarking scheme 
2169-3536 (c) 2019 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2921894, IEEE
Access
 
 
ROI
Cryptographic hash 
function
Cyclic redundancy 
check
IWT BTC
Tamper detection 
information of 
medical image D
Cryptographic hash 
function
Tamper localization 
information of ROI 
L
Tamper recovery 
information of ROI 
R
Authenticity data A
Divide ROI into 16×16 
non-overlapping blocks
Medical image
Hospital logo Authenticity data generation
Integrity data generation
Normalized ROI
 
FIGURE 3.  The process of watermark generation phase 
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FIGURE 4.  The normalization of ROI
Assume that the information is a 7-bit binary 
string “1100111”. Add 16 0’s to the end of 
“1100111” to obtain information 
“11001110000000000000000”. Then, the 
information is divided by fixed polynomial 
generator “11000000000000101” to obtain 
16-bit remainder “1000000101010001”. 
Repeat steps 3-6 until CRCs of all blocks have 
been calculated and combine all CRCs to obtain 
tamper localization information of ROI which is 
denoted as L. 
4) GENERATION OF TAMPER RECOVERY 
INFORMATION  
A trade-off is needed between the quality of 
recovered ROI and data size of tamper recovery 
information because of the limitation of 
watermark embedding capacity. We notice that 
the approximation coefficients matrix of IWT, 
which is much smaller than original image, still 
includes the major information of image due to 
the characteristics of multi-scale resolution of 
IWT. Therefore, this matrix is used for 
generating tamper recovery information of ROI 
in our scheme. In addition, BTC [31], which has 
not much impact on the quality of recovered 
ROI, is applied to further reduce the data size of 
recovery information. In our scheme, the 
approximation coefficient matrix is divided into 
4×4 non-overlapping blocks for BTC to obtain a 
remarkable trade-off between required 
embedding capacity and quality of the recovered 
medical image. The detailed steps of tamper 
recovery information generation are as follows: 
Step 1: Apply IWT on ROI Im and obtain 
Approximation (CA), Horizontal (CH), Vertical 
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(CV) and Diagonal (CD) coefficient matrices. 
Step 2: Divide CA into 4×4 non-overlapping 
blocks and apply BTC on each block to obtain a 
series of triples of binary matrix B, 
reconstructive level u1 and u2, as shown in 
algorithm 1.  
Algorithm 1 The encoding of BTC 
Input: medical block I 
Output: Binary matrix B, reconstructive level u1, and 
reconstructive level u2. 
1: u=mean2(I) 
2: row=size(I,1), col=size(I,2) 
3: B=zeros(row, col) 
4: sum1=0,sum2=0,q1=0,q2=0 
5: for i=1:row 
6:  for j=1:col 
7:    if I(i, j) < u 
8:     sum1=sum1+I(i, j), q1=q1+1 
9:    else 
10:    sum2=sum2+I(i, j), q2=q2+1, B(i, j)=1 
11:   end 
12:  end 
13:end 
14: u1=round(sum1/q1), u2=round(sum2/q2) 
Step 3: Convert u1 and u2 to 8-bit binary 
numbers respectively and then save these 
numbers in b1 and b2. 
Step 4: Rearrange B to a vector and combine 
this vector and b1, b2 to obtain tamper recovery 
information of ROI R.  
B. WATERMARK EMBEDDING PHASE 
SLT [32], an equivalent representation of DWT, 
obtains a better trade-off between 
time-localization and smoothness characteristics 
than DWT and thus can provide a better 
trade-off between imperceptibility and 
robustness for watermark applications [33], [34]. 
Therefore, in our proposed watermarking 
scheme, SLT is used for watermark embedding. 
Moreover, SVD is utilized and the most 
significant value of singular values matrix S is 
selected for watermark embedding. The 
utilization of SVD further enhances the 
watermarking robustness because this value is 
invariant to various attacks. Furthermore, 
inspired by [28], RDM-based function is applied 
to embed watermarks, which can restore the 
medical image losslessly. In this phase, 
watermarks are embedded without dividing the 
medical image into ROI and RONI to avoid 
security risks caused by spatially image dividing, 
which is different from ROI-lossless 
watermarking schemes. The process of 
watermark embedding phase is shown in Figure 
5 and described as follows:  
Step 1: Design a preprocessing function to 
avoid overflows and underflows, which may 
occur after embedding watermark. Bit “0” and 
“1” are embedded separately into each medical 
image block to obtain two different watermarked 
images by using our proposed scheme. The 
maximum value of possible distortion caused by 
watermark embedding, donated as T, is 
calculated based on these two watermarked 
images and the original image. 
Step 2: Divide the whole medical image into 
8×8 non-overlapping blocks. 
Step 3: Assign a unique number to each block 
in a zigzag order. Randomly pick a secret key k 
and use Eq. (3) to obtain scrambled map for 
watermark embedding Y. In this manner, the 
security level of watermark embedding is 
enhanced. 
( )mod 1i i bY k X N=  +        
 (3) 
where X is the zigzag ordering map for blocks, Y 
is the scrambled map for watermark embedding, 
Nb is the total number of blocks. i, k  [1, Nb]. k 
should be a prime number and Nb should not be 
divided by k. 
The Yith bit of watermark information is 
embedded into the Xith block. An example of the 
zigzag ordering map for blocks and its 
scrambled map for watermark embedding when 
secret key k=3 is shown in Figure 6. 
Step 4: Apply SLT on each block to obtain 
SLT coefficient matrix TB by using Eq. (4). 
 TTB MBM=           (4) 
where TB is the SLT coefficient matrix, M is an 
8×8 Slantlet matrix. Note that the sizes of TB, B 
and M are the same. 
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FIGURE 6.  An example of scrambling process, (a) zigzag 
ordering map for blocks, (b) scrambled map for watermark 
embedding 
Step 5: Divide TB into four sub-bands (LL, 
HL, LH and HH). 
Step 6: Apply SVD to sub-bands LL by using 
Eq. (5). 
TLL USV=             (5) 
where U and V are orthogonal matrices, S is a 
singular values matrix. 
Step 7: Embed one watermark bit into 
singular values matrix S by adjusting S(1,1) 
coefficient using RDM-based reversible 
embedding method as shown in algorithm 2. On 
one hand, S’(1,1) and P should be in the same 
jitter interval as shown in Eq. (6) to ensure 
watermark can be extracted correctly. Therefore, 
the value of G should be smaller than ∆/2. On 
the other hand, for the RDM based 
watermarking, the distortion E caused by 
watermark embedding will not be larger than ∆ 
and the G will not be larger than 1. As a result, ∆ 
should be larger than 2 to make sure that the 
watermark can be extracted correctly. 
'( / ) ( (1,1) / )floor P floor S =      (6) 
where the floor(•) is rounding toward negative 
infinity. 
Algorithm 2 RDM-based reversible embedding method 
Input: S matrix and quantization step ∆ 
Output: Watermarked singular values matrix S’ 
1: n=floor(S(1,1)/∆) 
2: if w=1 then 
3:  m=n+1−mod(n,2) 
4: else 
5:  m=n+1−mod(n+1,2) 
6: end 
7: P=m×∆+∆/2 
8: E= P−S(1,1) 
9: G= E/∆ 
10: S’ (1,1)=P+G 
Step 8: Apply inverse SVD on U, V and 
watermarked S’ to obtain sub-band LL’ by using 
Eq. (7). 
' ' TLL US V=             (7) 
where LL’ is watermarked LL, S’ is watermarked 
S. 
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Step 9: Apply inverse SLT on sub-bands HL, 
LH, HH and LL’ by using Eq. (8). 
'
' T LL HLB M M
LH HH
 
=  
 
       (8) 
where B’ is watermarked medical image block. 
Repeat steps 4 to 9 until all the watermark bits 
are embedded to obtain watermarked medical 
image. 
In order to solve the overflow and underflow 
problems, the pixels of watermarked image are 
adjusted by using Eq. (9). As the same with [29], 
the coordinates of modified pixels are saved as 
side information. The maximum watermark 
distortion T, secret key k, coordinates of 
normalized ROI and shifted pixels are sent with 
the modified watermarked image to the receiver 
side. 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
' '
' '
,     , 0
, ,         0 , 255 
, -    , 255
m
I i j T if I i j
I i j I i j if I i j
I i j T if I i j
 + 

=  
 
(9) 
where I’ is a watermarked image before pixel 
adjustment, (i, j) are the coordinates of pixels in 
image, and Im is a modified watermarked image. 
C. WATERMARK EXTRACTION PHASE 
Extracting watermarks from the watermarked 
medical image is just the inverse process of 
embedding watermarks into the medical image. 
The process of extracting watermark phase is 
shown in Figure 7 and described as follows:  
Step 1: Find the locations of shifted pixels 
and recover them to their original values based 
on the side information, as shown in Eq. (10). 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
'
, -       ,
,
,     , 255 -
m m
m m
I i j T if I i j T
I i j
I i j T if I i j T
 
= 
+ 
 (10) 
where I’(i, j) is the original watermarked image 
pixel, Im(i, j) is the modified watermarked image 
pixel, and (i, j) are the coordinates of pixels in 
image. 
Step 2: Divide the whole watermarked 
medical image into 8×8 non-overlapping blocks. 
Step 3: According to the secret key k, obtain 
random embedding sequence Y as shown in Eq. 
(3). 
Step 4: Apply SLT on each block to obtain 
SLT coefficient matrix TB by using Eq. (4). 
Step 5: Divide TB’ into four sub-bands (LL’, 
HL, LH and HH).  
Step 6: Apply SVD on sub-band LL’ to obtain 
singular values matrix S’ by using Eq. (5). 
Step 7: Extract watermark bit w from singular 
values matrix S’ by using Eq. (11). 
( )( )'mod( 1,1 / ,2)w floor S= 
    (11) 
where the floor(•) is rounding toward negative 
infinity. 
Step 8: Restore the original singular values 
matrix by using RDM-based reversible method 
as shown in algorithm 3. Because S’ (1,1) and P 
are in the same jitter interval as shown in Eq. (6), 
P’ is equal to P. As a result, E’ is equal to E and 
S(1,1) can be restored by using this algorithm. 
Step 9: Apply inverse SVD and inverse SLT 
to obtain the restored medical image block. 
LL’ HL
LH HH
LL’ SVD Extraction method
RDM-based 
reversible  method
Divide the whole medical image 
into 8×8 non-overlapping blocks
Original medical image
Apply SLT
Restored medical image
Inverse SVD
 LL HL
LH HH
Inverse SLT
 A’, D’, L’, and 
R’ 
Medical image blocks
 
FIGURE 7.  The process of watermark extraction phase
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Algorithm 3 RDM-based reversible method 
Input: S’ matrix, and quantization step ∆  
Output: Restored singular values matrix S 
1: n’=floor(S’ (1,1)/∆) 
2: P’=n’×∆+∆/2 
3: G’= S’ (1,1)-P’ 
4: E’= G’×∆ 
5: S(1,1)=P’-E’ 
Repeat steps 4 to 9 until all the watermark bits 
are extracted to obtain restored medical image. 
Reconstruct watermarks to obtain authenticity 
data A’, tamper detection information of ROI D’, 
tamper localization information of ROI L’, and 
tamper recovery information of ROI R’. 
D. SECURITY VERIFICATION PHASE 
Security verification consists of the verification 
of authenticity and integrity. The former 
guarantees that medical images are from right 
source. The latter ensures that medical images 
have not been modified when they are 
transferred through networks. The processes of 
security verification and tamper recovery are 
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 and described as 
follows: 
Step 1: Apply hash function on the hospital 
logo to obtain authenticity data A. 
Step 2: Compare A with A’ to ensure 
authenticity of a medical image. If the 
authenticity of the medical image is confirmed, 
run the next step of integrity verification. 
Otherwise, the medical image is considered as a 
forged image and our proposed scheme is 
finished. 
Step 3: Apply hash function on the restored 
medical image to obtain tamper detection 
information D. 
Step 4: Compare D with D’ to verify the 
integrity of the medical image. If no distortions 
are detected, our proposed scheme is finished. 
Otherwise, continue to run steps 5-13. 
Step 5: Obtain the coordinates of normalized 
ROI from the side information and divide the 
normalized ROI from the restored medical 
image. 
A’
Authenticity is 
confirmed ?
End
ROI
D D’
Values are equal ?
A
L L’
Tamper recoveryR’
Tamper localization
End
No
Yes
Yes
No
Protecting 
authenticity
Tamper detection
Recovered medical image
Hospital logo
Suspicious medical image
Values are equal ? End
Yes
No
Normalized ROI
 
FIGURE 8.  The process of security verification phase 
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Tamper recovery 
information R’
Inverse BTC CA*
0
CA
*
0
0
Inverse IWTRecovered block
Recovery medical image
Recovered ROI
 
FIGURE 9.  The process of tamper recovery 
Step 6: Divide normalized ROI of the restored 
medical image into 16×16 non-overlapping 
blocks. Apply CRC on each block to obtain 
tamper localization information L. 
Step 7: Compare L and L’ to locate the 
tampered areas of ROI. If all these two values 
are equal, ROI is not distorted and our scheme is 
finished. Otherwise, run steps 8-13. 
Step 8: Rearrange tamper recovery 
information of ROI R’ and divide it to get 
bit-mapping B, 8-bit binary numbers b1 and 
8-bit binary numbers b2. 
Step 9: Convert b1 and b2 from binary value 
to decimal value and then obtain reconstructive 
level u1 and reconstructive level u2. 
Step 10: The pixel value “0” in B is replaced 
by u1 and the pixel value “1” in B is replaced by 
u2 to obtain reconstructive approximation 
coefficient matrix CA*. 
Step 11: Set CH, CV and CD as zero matrices. 
Step 12: Apply inverse IWT to obtain 
recovered blocks. 
Step 13: Replace tampered blocks by recovered 
blocks for the recovery of ROI. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSIONS 
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In this paper, the watermark imperceptibility is 
first evaluated in section B. Then, the watermark 
robustness is evaluated in section C. the 
performances of tamper detection, localization 
and recovery functions are evaluated in section 
D. Finally, qualitative comparisons between our 
proposed scheme and other existing 
watermarking schemes are presented in section 
E. Our testing database contains 200 medical 
images. These medical images include 40 CT 
images, 40 MRI images, 40 Ultrasound images, 
40 X-ray images and 40 fundus images. 
Examples of five different types of medical 
images and a 32×32 hospital logo, which is used 
as the authenticity data, are shown in Figure 10. 
The quantization step ∆ should be set to a 
suitable value to achieve a remarkable tradeoff 
between watermarking robustness and 
imperceptibility. The watermark robustness is 
stronger if the quantization step ∆ is larger, but 
the watermark imperceptibility is worse at the 
same time. In our paper, ∆ is set to 24 
empirically. 
 
(a)                (b)               (c) 
 
(d)                (e)               (f) 
FIGURE 10.  Examples of five types of medical images and 
a binary hospital logo. (a) CT image, (b) MRI image, (c) 
Ultrasound image, (d) X-ray image, (e) fundus image, (f) 
hospital logo. 
B. EVALUATION OF WATERMARK 
IMPERCEPTIBILITY  
To evaluate the imperceptibility of our proposed 
watermarking scheme, both subjective and 
objective tests are executed.  
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(a)                       (b)                  (c)                   (d)                      (e) 
 
(f)                       (g)                  (h)                    (i)                      (j) 
FIGURE 11.  Examples of evaluating the watermarking imperceptibility. (a)-(e) original medical images, (f)-(j) watermarked 
medical images. 
In the subjective test, examples of different 
medical images and corresponding watermarked 
images are shown in Figure 11. It is difficult to 
distinguish the difference between original 
medical images and watermarked medical 
images. These results demonstrate that the 
imperceptibility of our proposed watermarking 
scheme is remarkable. 
In the objective test, the peak signal-to-noise 
ratio (PSNR) and structure similarity measure 
index (SSIM) between original medical images 
and watermarked medical images are calculated 
respectively to evaluate imperceptibility of our 
proposed watermarking scheme. The PSNR is 
calculated by using Eq. (12) and the SSIM is 
calculated by using Eq. (13). 
( ) ( )( )
2
10 2
'
1 1
255
10log
, ,
H W
i j
H W
PSNR
I i j I i j
= =
 
  =
  −
  
 (12) 
where I is a original medical image, I’ is a 
watermarked image, H and W are the height and 
the width of medical images, (i, j) are 
coordinates of pixels in these images. 
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( )( )
( )( )
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
2 2
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(13) 
where μx, μy are the averages of x and y, σ2x, σ2y 
are the variances and σxy are covariance for x and 
y respectively. C1 and C2 are balancing constants. 
PSNR and SSIM have ranges of [0, +∞] and [0, 
1]. Two images are considered to be more 
similar if their PSNR is closer to +∞ and SSIM is 
closer to 1.  
Mean PSNRs and mean SSIMs of our 
proposed watermarking scheme and other 
existing watermarking schemes [18], [20], [28], 
[29] are compared in Table 1. The mean PSNR 
of our proposed watermarking scheme is 
41.2995. This value is slightly larger than those 
of Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18] and Thabit et 
al.’s scheme [20], which are 39.7522 and 40.184. 
In addition, this value is comparable to those of 
Lei et al.’s scheme [28] and Thabit et al.’s 
scheme [29], which are 41.5525 and 42.8972. 
The mean SSIM of our proposed watermarking 
scheme is 0.9607. This value is the same with 
that of Thabit et al.’s scheme [20] and nearly 
equal to those of the compared watermarking 
schemes [18], [28], [29], which are 0.9669, 
0.9660 and 0.9670. The results demonstrate that 
the imperceptibility of our proposed 
watermarking scheme is remarkable and 
comparable with those of state-of-art schemes. 
The reason of these results is the utilization of 
SLT transform for watermark embedding, which 
can provide a remarkable trade-off between 
imperceptibility and robustness.  
TABLE 1. The mean PSNRs and the mean SSIMs of different watermarking schemes 
 Proposed scheme Maheshkar et al. [18] Thabit et al. [20] Lei et al. [28] Thabit et al. [29] 
PSNR 41.2995 39.7522 40.1841 41.5525 42.8972 
SSIM 0.9607 0.9669 0.9607 0.9660 0.9670 
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C. EVALUATION OF WATERMARK 
ROBUSTNESS  
To evaluate the robustness of watermarking 
schemes, bit error rate (BER) and normalized 
cross correlation (NCC) between original 
watermarks and extracted watermarks are 
calculated respectively according to Eq. (14) and 
Eq. (15). The value of BER is closer to 0 and the 
value of NCC is closer to 1, the robustness of 
watermarking scheme is stronger. 23 common 
attacks with different parameters, as shown in 
Table 2, are applied to test the watermarking 
robustness. In this section, our proposed scheme 
is compared with other four different existing 
watermarking schemes [18], [20], [28], [29] to 
demonstrate its superiority. The mean BERs and 
NCCs of authenticity data, tamper localization 
information, tamper recovery information of 
different schemes are listed in Table 3, 4 and 5, 
respectively. 
    
   
Number of incorrectly decoded bits
BER
Total number of bits
=
 
(14) 
( ) ( )( )
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1 1
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=
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 
   (15) 
where H and W are the height and the width of 
watermark, Wo is the original watermark, We is 
the extracted watermark, (i, j) are coordinates of 
pixels in these watermarks. 
As shown in Table 3, all the mean BERs of 
authenticity data by using our proposed 
watermarking scheme are close to 0 and all the 
mean NCCs of authenticity data by using our 
proposed watermarking scheme are close to 1. 
These results demonstrate that our proposed 
watermarking scheme can provide reliable 
authenticity verification function for medical 
images. In addition, the average value of mean 
BERs of our proposed watermarking scheme, 
which is 0.0476, is smaller than those of 
Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18], Thabit et al.’s 
scheme [20] and Lei et al.’s scheme [28], which 
are 0.0927, 0.0711, and 0.1003. This value is 
comparable to that of Thabit et al.’s scheme [29], 
which is 0.0365. The average value of mean 
NCCs of our proposed watermarking scheme, 
which is 0.9624, is larger than those of 
Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18], Thabit et al.’s 
scheme [20] and Lei et al.’s scheme [28], which 
are 0.9322, 0.9362, and 0.8702. This value is 
comparable to that of Thabit et al.’s scheme [29], 
which is 0.9586. These results demonstrate that 
the reliability of authenticity verification 
function in our proposed watermarking scheme 
is higher than those in Maheshkar et al.’s scheme 
[18], Thabit et al.’s scheme [20] and Lei et al.’s 
scheme [28], and comparable with that in Thabit 
et al.’s scheme [29]. The reasons of the above 
phenomena are below. First, the utilization of 
low frequency coefficients of SLT transform, 
which concentrates the major energy of medical 
images, ensures the sufficient watermarking 
robustness. Second, the utilization of the largest 
singular value of SVD transform, which is also 
invariant to attacks, strengthens the 
watermarking robustness. Third, the utilization 
of RDM-based embedding method further 
enhances the watermarking robustness.  
Especially, Thabit et al.’s scheme [20] 
modifies the difference between the mean values 
of low-high frequency sub-bands and those of 
high-low frequency sub-bands in SLT domain to 
embed authenticity data into ROI, whereas 
embeds tamper localization information and 
tamper recovery information into RONI by 
modifying the difference between the individual 
pixels of low-high frequency sub-bands and 
those of high-low frequency sub-bands in SLT 
domain. Therefore, the mean BERs and NCCs of 
authenticity data of this scheme are much better 
than those of tamper localization information 
and tamper recovery information, which are 
listed in Tables 4 and 5. 
TABLE 2. Attacks with parameters 
Attack type Parameters Attack type Parameters 
Average filtering (AF) Window=3×3, 5×5 Median filtering (MF) Window=3×3, 5×5 
Gaussian blurring (GB) Window=3×3, variance=0.5, 1 Crop from image edges (CR) 5%, 10%, 20% 
Gaussian noise (GN) 
variance=0.0001, Mean=0.001, 0.003, 
0.0005 
Salt & pepper noise (SN) 
Density=0.001, 0.003, 
0.0005 
JPEG compression (JC) Quality=70, 80 Resizing (RS) 0.8, 1.2 
JPEG2000 compression Compression ratio=4, 8 Wiener filter (WF) Window=3×3, 5×5 
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TABLE 3. The mean BERs and NCCs of authenticity data under various attacks  
Attacks Proposed scheme Maheshkar et al. [18] Thabit et al. [20] Lei et al. [28] Thabit et al. [29] 
BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC 
AF (3×3) 0.0705 0.9604 0.1071 0.8868 0.0622 0.9463 0.1485 0.8132 0.0146 0.9844 
AF (5×5) 0.1371 0.8978 0.2425 0.7831 0.3393 0.6953 0.2659 0.6955 0.1424 0.8543 
MF(3×3) 0.0457 0.9759 0.0866 0.9115 0.0539 0.9549 0.1039 0.8557 0.0162 0.9823 
MF (5×5) 0.1098 0.9215 0.2353 0.7934 0.3807 0.6538 0.2170 0.7369 0.2138 0.7793 
GB (0.5) 0.0094 0.9937 0.0162 0.9797 0.0000 1.0000 0.0217 0.9780 0.0000 1.0000 
GB (1) 0.0914 0.9422 0.1064 0.8733 0.0491 0.9585 0.1671 0.7963 0.0031 0.9965 
CR (5%) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0361 0.9879 0.0058 0.9956 0.0526 0.9081 0.0138 0.9816 
CR (10%) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0793 0.9844 0.0130 0.9836 0.1051 0.8061 0.0610 0.8980 
CR (20%) 0.0644 0.9803 0.1538 0.9842 0.0424 0.9455 0.1907 0.6402 0.1558 0.7643 
GN (0.001) 0.0117 0.9885 0.0722 0.9273 0.0001 0.9993 0.0578 0.9357 0.0011 0.9990 
GN (0.003) 0.0721 0.9016 0.0730 0.9268 0.0009 0.9992 0.1779 0.8116 0.0012 0.9989 
GN (0.005) 0.1349 0.8723 0.0733 0.9260 0.0011 0.9991 0.2072 0.7818 0.0013 0.9987 
SN (0.001) 0.0282 0.9744 0.0565 0.9791 0.0242 0.9786 0.0220 0.9386 0.0051 0.9950 
SN (0.003) 0.0758 0.9306 0.0691 0.9642 0.0684 0.9399 0.0611 0.9386 0.0142 0.9855 
SN (0.005) 0.1246 0.8866 0.0808 0.9493 0.1013 0.9100 0.0971 0.9023 0.0240 0.9758 
JC (Q=70) 0.0061 0.9939 0.1062 0.9700 0.1294 0.8806 0.0155 0.9842 0.0422 0.9851 
JC (Q=80) 0.0032 0.9982 0.0940 0.9721 0.0470 0.9577 0.0048 0.9955 0.0025 0.9970 
JPEG2000 (4) 0.0023 0.9993 0.0475 0.9755 0.0012 0.9988 0.0021 0.9979 0.0044 0.9961 
JPEG2000 (8) 0.0133 0.9874 0.0851 0.9539 0.0227 0.9819 0.0239 0.9616 0.0401 0.9638 
RS (0.8) 0.0057 0.9972 0.0265 0.9683 0.0035 0.9975 0.0255 0.9654 0.0001 0.9999 
RS (1.2) 0.0010 0.9988 0.0080 0.9906 0.0001 1.0000 0.0069 0.9934 0.0000 1.0000 
WF (3×3) 0.0122 0.9935 0.0787 0.9203 0.0539 0.9662 0.1000 0.8629 0.0130 0.9871 
WF (5×5) 0.0757 0.9418 0.1977 0.8320 0.2347 0.7911 0.2333 0.7280 0.0704 0.9250 
Average 0.0476 0.9624 0.0927 0.9322 0.0711 0.9362 0.1003 0.8702 0.0365 0.9586 
 
As shown in Table 4, all the mean BERs of 
tamper localization information by using our 
proposed watermarking scheme are close to 0 
and all the mean NCCs of tamper localization 
information by using our proposed watermarking 
scheme are close to 1. These results demonstrate 
that our proposed watermarking scheme can 
provide reliable localization function for the 
tampered areas of medical images, which cannot 
be achieved by Lei et al.’s scheme [28], and 
Thabit et al.’s scheme [29]. In addition, the 
average value of mean BERs of our proposed 
watermarking scheme, which is 0.0462, is 
smaller than those of Maheshkar et al.’s scheme 
[18] and Thabit et al.’s scheme [20], which are 
0.3502, and 0.2154. The average value of mean 
NCCs of our proposed watermarking scheme, 
which is 0.9562, is larger than those of 
Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18] and Thabit et 
al.’s scheme [20], which are 0.6590, and 0.7752. 
These results demonstrate that the reliability of 
tamper localization function in our proposed 
watermarking scheme is higher than those in 
Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18], and Thabit et 
al.’s scheme [20]. Reasons of the results in Table 
4 are the same with those in Table 3.  
Especially, Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18] 
replaces LSBs of ROI to embed localization 
information whereas embeds hospital logo and 
tamper recovery information into RONI by using 
IWT-SVD based method. Therefore, the mean 
BERs and NCCs of tamper localization 
information of this scheme are much worse than 
those of hospital logo and tamper recovery 
information as shown in Tables 3 and 5. 
As shown in Table 5, all the mean BERs of 
tamper recovery information by using our 
proposed watermarking scheme are close to 0 
and all the mean NCCs of tamper recovery 
information by using our proposed watermarking 
scheme are close to 1. These results demonstrate 
that our proposed watermarking scheme can 
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provide reliable recovery function for the 
tampered areas of medical images, which cannot 
be achieved by Lei et al.’s scheme [28], and 
Thabit et al.’s scheme [29]. In addition, the 
average value of mean BERs of our proposed 
watermarking scheme, which is 0.0456, is 
smaller than those of Maheshkar et al.’s scheme 
[18] and Thabit et al.’s scheme [20], which are 
0.0889, and 0.2049. The average value of mean 
NCCs of our proposed watermarking scheme, 
which is 0.9562, is larger than those of 
Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18] and Thabit et 
al.’s scheme [20], which are 0.9346, and 0.7377. 
These results demonstrate that the reliability of 
tamper recovery function in our proposed 
watermarking scheme is higher than those in 
Maheshkar et al.’s scheme [18], and Thabit et 
al.’s scheme [20]. Reasons of the results in Table 
5 are the same with those in Table 3. 
D. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCES OF 
TAMPER DETECTION, LOCALIZATION AND 
RECOVERY FUNCTIONS 
In this section, erasing and copy-paste tampering 
process is imposed on watermarked medical 
images to evaluate tamper detection, localization 
and recovery subjectively and objectively, as the 
same with [18], [20]. 
In the subjective test, erasing and copy-paste 
tampering process is imposed on watermarked 
medical images to evaluate tamper detection, 
localization and recovery. As shown in Figure 12, 
our proposed scheme can successfully detect and 
locate tampered areas of ROI. In addition, it is 
difficult to distinguish the difference between 
original medical images and recovered medical 
images. These results demonstrate that our 
proposed watermarking scheme can provide 
remarkable tamper detection, localization and 
recovery functions for tampered ROI. 
TABLE 4. The mean BERs and NCCs of tamper localization information under various attacks  
Attacks Proposed scheme Maheshkar et al. [18] Thabit et al. [20] Lei et al. [28] Thabit et al. [29] 
BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC 
AF (3×3) 0.0478 0.9541 0.4957 0.5041 0.4707 0.5134 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
AF (5×5) 0.1422 0.8525 0.5018 0.5006 0.4852 0.5001 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
MF(3×3) 0.0250 0.9687 0.3295 0.6695 0.4220 0.5641 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
MF (5×5) 0.1038 0.8900 0.5666 0.5632 0.5349 0.5007 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GB (0.5) 0.0041 0.9944 0.4413 0.5581 0.0132 0.9862 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GB (1) 0.0681 0.9322 0.4969 0.5028 0.2030 0.7907 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
CR (5%) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0124 0.9739 0.0223 0.9661 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
CR (10%) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0347 0.9273 0.0549 0.9097 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
CR (20%) 0.0627 0.8901 0.0812 0.8320 0.1668 0.7827 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GN (0.001) 0.0103 0.9948 0.4977 0.5018 0.1101 0.8843 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GN (0.003) 0.0587 0.9868 0.4979 0.5017 0.1102 0.8839 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GN (0.005) 0.1395 0.9329 0.4999 0.5013 0.1112 0.8830 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
SN (0.001) 0.0358 0.9651 0.0006 0.9994 0.0261 0.9710 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
SN (0.003) 0.0970 0.9031 0.0015 0.9986 0.0649 0.9303 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
SN (0.005) 0.1397 0.8521 0.0026 0.9973 0.0959 0.8976 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JC (Q=70) 0.0057 0.9965 0.4960 0.5036 0.4130 0.5706 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JC (Q=80) 0.0041 0.9975 0.4931 0.5066 0.3564 0.6293 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JPEG2000 (4) 0.0015 0.9985 0.2886 0.7107 0.0682 0.9296 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JPEG2000 (8) 0.0088 0.9956 0.4565 0.5433 0.2527 0.7359 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
RS (0.8) 0.0026 0.9973 0.4709 0.5288 0.0980 0.8994 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
RS (1.2) 0.0008 0.9992 0.4009 0.5988 0.0175 0.9819 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
WF (3×3) 0.0113 0.9868 0.4908 0.6695 0.4220 0.5697 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
WF (5×5) 0.0929 0.9043 0.5007 0.5632 0.4345 0.5505 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Average 0.0462 0.9562 0.3502 0.6590 0.2154 0.7752 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
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TABLE 5. The mean BERs and NCs of tamper recovery information under various attacks  
Attacks Proposed scheme Maheshkar et al. [18] Thabit et al. [20] Lei et al. [28] Thabit et al. [29] 
BER NC BER NC BER NC BER NC BER NC 
AF (3×3) 0.0397 0.9592 0.1043 0.8909 0.4240 0.4813 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
AF (5×5) 0.1508 0.8490 0.2377 0.7864 0.4740 0.4337 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
MF(3×3) 0.0254 0.9726 0.0838 0.9142 0.3734 0.5390 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
MF (5×5) 0.1114 0.8836 0.2300 0.7974 0.4785 0.4332 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GB (0.5) 0.0044 0.9963 0.0154 0.9815 0.0163 0.9759 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GB (1) 0.0607 0.9402 0.1046 0.8781 0.2202 0.7200 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
CR (5%) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0348 0.9874 0.0329 0.9357 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
CR (10%) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0759 0.9852 0.0849 0.8320 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
CR (20%) 0.0498 0.9183 0.1490 0.9845 0.2100 0.6919 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GN (0.001) 0.0059 0.9950 0.0666 0.9327 0.1043 0.8540 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GN (0.003) 0.0598 0.9860 0.0670 0.9323 0.1200 0.8538 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
GN (0.005) 0.1010 0.9486 0.0677 0.9315 0.1250 0.8531 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
SN (0.001) 0.0390 0.9599 0.0535 0.9802 0.0279 0.9584 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
SN (0.003) 0.1056 0.8935 0.0662 0.9651 0.0692 0.8999 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
SN (0.005) 0.1552 0.8373 0.0782 0.9508 0.0750 0.8498 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JC (Q=70) 0.0043 0.9946 0.0974 0.9716 0.3785 0.5337 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JC (Q=80) 0.0031 0.9957 0.0865 0.9732 0.3087 0.6147 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JPEG2000 (4) 0.0020 0.9969 0.0452 0.9774 0.0750 0.9351 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
JPEG2000 (8) 0.0058 0.9941 0.0789 0.9564 0.2650 0.7258 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
RS (0.8) 0.0029 0.9975 0.0249 0.9705 0.1071 0.8645 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
RS (1.2) 0.0007 0.9992 0.0075 0.9915 0.0213 0.9704 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
WF (3×3) 0.0112 0.9867 0.0761 0.9233 0.4100 0.5187 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
WF (5×5) 0.1099 0.8873 0.1932 0.8336 0.4161 0.4927 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Average 0.0456 0.9562 0.0889 0.9346 0.2049 0.7377 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  
 
In the objective test, the false-positive rate Pfpd 
and the false-negative rate Pfnd of tamper 
detection under erasing and copy-paste 
tampering are calculated by using Eq. (16) and 
Eq. (17) and the results are listed in Table 6 and 
Table 7. Pfpd is a probability of considering a 
lossless image as a tampered one. Pfnd is a 
probability of considering a tampered image as 
lossless one. 
fpd
fpd
disd
N
P
N
=             (16) 
fnd
fnd
sd
N
P
N
=             (17) 
where Nfpd is the number of lossless images 
which are considered as tampered ones, Ndisd is 
the true number of lossless images, Nfnd is the 
number of tampered images which are 
considered as lossless ones, Nsd is the true 
number of tampered images. 
The false-positive rate Pfpl and the 
false-negative rate Pfnl of tamper localization 
under erasing and copy-paste tampering are 
calculated by using Eq. (18) and Eq. (19) and the 
results are listed in Table 6 and Table 7. Pfpl is a 
probability of considering a lossless ROI block 
as tampered one. Pfnl is a probability of 
considering a tampered ROI block as lossless 
one. 
fpl
fpl
disl
N
P
N
=            (18) 
fnl
fnl
sl
N
P
N
=            (19) 
where Nfpl is the number of lossless ROI blocks 
which are considered as tampered ones, Ndisl is 
the true number of lossless ROI blocks, Nfnl is 
the number of tampered ROI blocks which are 
considered as lossless ones, Nsl is the true 
number of tampered ROI blocks. 
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(a)                           (b)                           (c)                           (d) 
 
(e)                           (f)                            (g)                          (h)  
FIGURE 12.  Examples to evaluate tamper detection, localization and recovery, (a) watermarked image, (b) erase tampered 
image, (c) localization of tampered blocks, (d) recovery of erase tampered image, (e) watermarked image, (f) copy-paste 
tampered image, (g) localization of copy-paste tampered blocks, (h) recovery of copy-paste tampered image. 
TABLE 6. The false-positive rate and false-negative rate of tamper detection and localization under erase 
tampering 
Ratio of tampered blocks in ROI 
Tamper detection Tamper localization  
Pfpd Pfnd Pfpl Pfnl 
1 random pixel 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 
50% 0 0 0 0 
75% 0 0 0 0 
100% 0 0 0 0 
TABLE 7. The false-positive rate and false-negative rate of tamper detection and localization under copy-paste 
tampering 
Ratio of tampered blocks in ROI 
Tamper detection Tamper localization  
Pfpd Pfnd Pfpl Pfnl 
1 random pixel 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 
50% 0 0 0 0 
75% 0 0 0 0 
100% 0 0 0 0 
 
The mean PSNRs and the mean SSIMs 
between original images and recovered images 
are calculated to evaluate the performance of 
temper recovery. In our proposed watermarking 
scheme, the results of tamper recovery are the 
same when the ratios of tampered blocks in ROI 
under erasing and copy-paste tampering are the 
same. Therefore, they are listed in one same 
Table, which is Table 8. 
As shown in Table 6, all the Pfps and Pfns of 
tamper detection and localization under erase 
tampering are 0. As shown in Table 7, all the Pfps 
and Pfns of tamper detection and localization 
under copy-paste tampering are also 0. These 
results demonstrate that our scheme can detect 
and locate any distortions on tampered areas of 
ROI reliably and precisely by utilizing hash 
functions and CRC.  
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TABLE 8. The mean PSNRs and the mean SSIMs between original images and recovered images 
 Ratio of tampered 
blocks in ROI 
ROI of medical images Tampered blocks 
PSNR (db) SSIM PSNR (db) SSIM 
200 medical images 
1 random pixel 66.8374 0.9999 55.1561 0.9990 
25% 54.1422 0.9963 46.0746 0.9618 
50% 51.4307 0.9879 47.0958 0.9772 
75% 48.7422 0.9760 46.7932 0.9788 
100% 45.3569 0.9762 45.3569 0.9762 
40 CT images 
1 random pixel 61.4102 0.9999 56.5655 0.9991 
25% 56.2484 0.9972 52.9370 0.9658 
50% 55.7332 0.9911 54.0775 0.9860 
75% 54.8616 0.9841 54.1120 0.9892 
100% 55.0736 0.9884 55.0736 0.9884 
40 MRI images 
1 random pixel 67.8338 0.9999 54.0413 0.9993 
25% 53.4147 0.9965 44.0827 0.9586 
50% 50.2549 0.9864 45.1374 0.9701 
75% 48.2119 0.9706 45.7756 0.9704 
100% 43.0274 0.9668 43.0274 0.9668 
40 ultrasound images 
1 random pixel 64.4322 0.9999 55.1829 0.9993 
25% 54.7881 0.9986 48.4664 0.9779 
50% 53.0997 0.9951 49.6379 0.9873 
75% 51.2322 0.9889 49.6079 0.9882 
100% 45.7199 0.9843 45.7199 0.9843 
40 X-ray images 
1 random pixel 65.6261 0.9990 52.2289 0.9986 
25% 50.2527 0.9908 40.9208 0.9342 
50% 47.5516 0.9738 42.1331 0.9683 
75% 42.1711 0.9531 39.7348 0.9718 
100% 38.4723 0.9683 38.4723 0.9683 
40 fundus images 
1 random pixel 74.8845 0.9999 57.7617 0.9993 
25% 56.0073 0.9986 43.9661 0.9723 
50% 50.5139 0.9929 44.4933 0.9745 
75% 47.2342 0.9832 44.7354 0.9742 
100% 44.4914 0.9734 44.4914 0.9734 
 
As shown in Table 8, our proposed 
watermarking scheme provides remarkable 
recovery function for tampered areas of ROI. 
When modifying 1 random pixel, 25%, 50%, 75% 
and even 100% of ROI, the mean PSNRs and 
SSIMs between original ROI and recovered ROI 
of 200 medical images are 66.8374, 54.1422, 
51.4307, 48.7422, 45.3569 and 0.9999, 0.9963, 
0.9879, 0.9760, 0.9762, respectively. The mean 
PSNRs and SSIMs between the original blocks 
which have been tampered and their 
corresponding recovered blocks of 200 medical 
images are 55.1561, 46.0746, 47.0958, 46.7932, 
45.3569 and 0.9990, 0.9618, 0.9772, 0.9788, 
0.9762, respectively. In addition, all the mean 
PSNRs and SSIMs between original ROI and 
recovered ROI of five different types medical 
images are larger than 61.4102, 50.2527, 
47.5516, 42.1711, 38.4723 and 0.9990, 0.9908, 
0.9738, 0.9531, 0.9683, respectively. In addition, 
all the mean PSNRs and SSIMs between the 
original blocks which have been tampered and 
their corresponding recovered blocks of five 
different types medical images are larger than 
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62.2289, 40.9208, 42.1331, 39.7348, 38.4723 
and 0.9986, 0.9342, 0.9683, 0.9704, 0.9668, 
respectively. All the values of these PSNRs and 
SSIMs are quite large, which demonstrate that 
our proposed watermarking scheme provides 
remarkable recovery function for tampered areas 
of ROI. The reason of these results is that tamper 
recovery information of ROI is generated based 
on the approximation coefficient matrix of IWT, 
which contains the most information of ROI. 
Especially, the mean PSNR of X-Ray images 
are lower than those of other images when the 
tamper ratios are large. The reason of this 
phenomenon is that X-Ray images tested in our 
experiment have more unstructured details 
comparing to the other testing images. 
E. QUALITATIVE COMPARISONS 
Qualitative comparisons between our proposed 
schemes with ROI-lossless watermarking and 
reversible watermarking schemes are conducted 
in terms of five aspects: 1) the sufficiency of 
watermark robustness; 2) the involvement of 
tamper recovery function; 3) the reversibility of 
medical image; 4) whether ROI and RONI are 
divided for watermark embedding; and 5) 
whether ROI and RONI are divided for 
watermark generation. The results are shown in 
Table 9. Compared with the spatial 
domain-based ROI-lossless watermarking 
schemes [13]-[17], our proposed watermarking 
scheme is much more robust against various 
attacks and thus provides more reliable 
verifications of image authenticity. Compared 
with both the spatial domain-based and the 
frequency domain-based ROI-lossless 
watermarking schemes [13]-[21], our proposed 
watermarking scheme restores both ROI and 
RONI losslessly and thus there are no negative 
impacts on medical diagnosis. In addition, our 
proposed watermarking scheme embeds 
watermarks without dividing medical images 
into ROI and RONI. In this manner, the security 
risks caused by the segmentation of the ROI and 
the RONI in spatial domain for watermark 
embedding are avoided, which cannot be 
achieved by either spatial domain-based or 
frequency domain-based ROI-lossless 
watermarking schemes. Compared with the 
fragile reversible watermarking [22]-[27], our 
proposed watermarking scheme provides 
stronger robustness against various attacks and 
thus provides more reliable verifications of 
image authenticity. Compared with both fragile 
and robust reversible watermarking schemes 
[22]-[29], our proposed watermarking scheme 
divides ROI and RONI for watermark generation 
and provides an effective recovery function for 
tampered ROI under limited embedding capacity. 
In this manner, the most diagnosis values of 
medical images are still maintained even they 
are attacked, which cannot be achieved by either 
fragile or robust reversible watermarking 
schemes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a novel robust reversible 
watermarking scheme based on SLT-SVD 
hybrid transform is proposed for verifying 
authenticity and integrity of medical images. To 
the best of our knowledge, it is the first 
watermarking scheme which ROI and RONI are 
divided only for watermark generation, whereas 
they are not divided for watermark embedding. 
The analytical and experimental results have 
demonstrated that our proposed watermarking 
scheme provides remarkable performances in 
terms of robustness, imperceptibility, 
authentication, tamper detection, tamper 
localization, and tamper recovery. Moreover, our 
proposed watermarking scheme has following 
merits compared with other existing 
TABLE 9. Qualitative comparisons with other watermarking schemes 
 
ROI-lossless watermarking Reversible watermarking Proposed 
scheme 
Spatial [13]-[17] Frequency [18]-[21] Fragile [22]-[27] Robust [28],[29] 
Watermark robustness Insufficient Sufficient Insufficient Sufficient Sufficient 
Tamper recovery Involved Involved Not involved Not involved Involved 
Reversibility ROI-Reversible ROI-Reversible Reversible Reversible Reversible 
Watermark generation 
ROI and RONI 
are divided 
ROI and RONI 
are divided 
ROI and RONI 
are not divided 
ROI and RONI 
are not divided 
ROI and RONI 
are divided 
Watermark embedding 
ROI and RONI 
are divided 
ROI and RONI 
are divided 
ROI and RONI 
are not divided 
ROI and RONI 
are not divided 
ROI and RONI 
are not divided 
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watermarking schemes for protecting medical 
images: 1) by using RDM-based reversible 
function for watermark embedding, both ROI 
and RONI can be restored losslessly, which 
outperforms existing ROI-lossless watermarking; 
2) by using SLT-SVD hybrid transform and 
RDM-based embedding method, our proposed 
watermarking scheme provides strong 
robustness against various attacks, which 
outperforms existing spatial domain-based 
ROI-lossless watermarking and fragile reversible 
watermarking; 3) by dividing ROI and RONI 
and using IWT with BTC for generation of the 
tamper recovery information of ROI, our 
proposed watermarking scheme can recover the 
tampered areas of ROI under limited embedding 
capacity, which cannot be achieved by existing 
reversible watermarking schemes; 4) by 
embedding watermark into the whole medical 
image without dividing ROI and RONI, our 
proposed watermarking scheme avoids the 
security risks caused by spatially image dividing, 
which outperforms existing ROI-lossless 
watermarking.  
Our future work will focus on how to further 
enhance the watermarking robustness against the 
rotation attacks by designing a pre-process 
registration step based on local features and 
increase the embedding capacity of reversible 
watermarking schemes. 
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